Author: Sahan S. Karatasli

  • Introducing the ASA-CHS Teaching Initiative

    Introducing the ASA-CHS Teaching Initiative

    Damon Mayrl, Colby College

    Robert Braun, University of California, Berkeley

    As graduate students, comparative-historical sociologists are trained in how to conceive, design, and carry out historical research in a wide range of spatial-temporal contexts. Far fewer of us are trained in how to conceive, design, or lead a course on comparative-historical sociology. In this, we are not alone—graduate education in sociology more generally emphasizes research over teaching. Yet at the same time, the sprawling character of comparative-historical sociology makes teaching it particularly challenging. Should we foreground method or substance? Which methods? Which substantive foci? Which regions? For many, it can be easier to teach required introductory or theory courses, or courses in our other subdisciplinary foci, where syllabi of friends and colleagues are more readily available as templates. As a result, comparative-historical sociology is often conspicuous by its absence in the curriculum—especially at the undergraduate level.

    This pedagogical deficit impacts comparative-historical sociologists’ job market prospects. Why should a department hire a historical sociologist or a comparativist? For us, the answer may be obvious: studying historical change in different societies is an essential means of denaturalizing the social world, decentering the present, contextualizing the United States, and—perhaps most importantly—revealing threads and patterns that help us understand the here and now. Lessons from different times and places acquired through historical inquiry, are essential to understanding current events, from pandemics to police violence and beyond.

    But for hiring committees, especially outside of research-intensive graduate programs, this rationale is not always so obvious. What will comparative-historical sociologists teach? Will students take such a course? And what is comparative-historical sociology, anyway? These answers are often not clear to search committees and deans, and the results are visible in the low number of job searches targeting historical sociologists, and in the persistent sense among many of our colleagues that historical sociology is like a Panerai watch or Prada bag—prestigious and elegant, but ultimately only a luxurious accessory for the most elite departments (Adams et al. 2005; Prasad 2006).

    We think it is time to take the teaching of historical sociology more seriously, at both the graduate and undergraduate levels. We seek to find out how comparative-historical sociologists are teaching our subdiscipline, and to share that knowledge amongst ourselves. What kinds of courses and assignments work well to inspire undergraduates to undertake their own comparative-historical sociological projects? How can we teach our rich and plural methodological options to graduate students in ways that foster rigor and creativity simultaneously? What obstacles may present themselves along the way? And if they do, how can we overcome them, to make historical sociology a more central substantive and methodological component of both undergraduate and graduate curricula?

    With this in mind, we plan to inaugurate a new teaching initiative this summer under the auspices of the ASA Section on Comparative and Historical Sociology. This initiative has two main goals: (1) to develop a database of sample syllabi and assignments, and (2) to create a space for exchange around strategies for teaching historical sociology. We aim to include a wide range of epistemological, methodological and theoretical approaches, and to develop an account of comparative-historical sociology that adequately captures racial, gender, and class diversity:

    • Graduate syllabus database. Our first goal is to create a database of syllabi and assignments for both graduate and undergraduate courses. At the graduate level, historical sociology has a more robust presence, and historical sociologists have developed a wide array of approaches to teaching the field—from guiding students through hands-on practice in archives, to centering questions of logic of inquiry and causal inference, to closely analyzing classic texts in the field, and beyond. We aim to gather these, to better highlight the diversity of texts and approaches being taught in graduate departments, and place them in an accessible forum for section members, so that they may learn about and share ways of structuring graduate courses. Doing so, moreover, will create a space for us as a community to reflect and re-envision how historical sociology might be taught with a greater diversity of traditions and positions, an expanded canon, and a more global vision.
    • Undergraduate syllabus database. At the undergraduate level, we similarly seek to gather as many syllabi and assignments as possible and make them available to section members. Historical sociology qua historical sociology is infrequently taught at the undergraduate level, although it may often be taught through more topical courses on war, revolutions, policy change, and other topics. We are interested in casting a wide net. We are also interested in thinking through the best ways to teach courses in “social change” more specifically. Social change is a topic with an illustrious history in sociology, and historical sociologists—with their sensitivity to temporality and knowledge of the mechanisms of historical change—are uniquely positioned to teach such a course. Yet there are few available models for how to teach it that center historical sociology, especially at the undergraduate level. We hope to pool our brainpower to develop one or more model syllabi for undergraduate courses on “social change” that faculty and graduate students could incorporate into their teaching portfolios or use as inspiration as they develop their own courses.
    • Assignment database. A related goal is to create a database of assignments for teaching aspects of historical sociology. How can we introduce students to historical research in the compressed space of a single semester? What kinds of assignments work best? What should our learning outcomes be, at the undergraduate and at the graduate level? As part of that, what aspects of our subdiscipline should we emphasize through our assignments—substantive aspects, methodological training, or something else? And what kinds of assignments best enable us to achieve our objectives? Again, by pooling our resources and knowledge, we can allow for the diffusion of successful and innovative assignments that bring historical sociology to life for our students.
    • A pedagogical community. Finally, we hope to create a virtual (and, when conditions again permit, in-person) forum for interested historical sociologists to come together and discuss strategies for teaching historical sociology. Such a community might meet regularly at ASA and SSHA, and maintain a virtual community for exchange of syllabi, assignments, reflections, and other materials and ideas throughout the calendar year.

    We invite all interested members of the Section on Comparative and Historical Sociology to join us in this initiative. If you are interested in sharing your syllabi (undergraduate or graduate), assignments, and ideas about how to improve how we teach historical sociology, we want to hear from you. Please email us at 2020teachs@gmail.com if you are interested or have materials to share.

    Thanks, and we hope to hear from many of you!

    * This essay is from Trajectories, Spring-Summer 2020, pp.47-49

  • Populism and Religion: Comparative Historical Approaches (ASA2020)

    Populism and Religion: Comparative Historical Approaches (ASA2020)

    How do populists utilize religion as an identity marker and mobilization tool? And how do religious leaders and communities deploy populism?

    This session, which took place on 10 August 2020 at the American Sociological Association (ASA) annual meeting, explores these and other questions to shed light on the populism-religion nexus. (Co-organized by the ASA’s Comparative-Historical Sociology and Sociology of Religion Sections).

    Organizers: Efe Peker, University of Ottawa & Gulay Turkmen, University of Goettingen

    Presenters: • Religion and Gender in the European Populist Right – Ayse Serdar, Instanbul Technical University; Ebru Öztürk, Mid Sweden University; Katarina Giritli Nygren, Mid Sweden University

    • Religion, Populism, and Nationalism in Nine Eastern European States Pamela Irving Jackson, Rhode Island College; Peter E. Doerschler, Bloomsburg University

    • Religious Populism in America and the Possibility for Democratic Politics Rhys H. Williams, Loyola University-Chicago Discussant: Shai M. Dromi, Harvard University

  • SECTION JOB OPPORTUNITY: SECTION WEB-PAGE

    We are looking for a member to join our web editorial team for at least two years. The web-editor will be part of an existing team that updates the dynamic content at our website: http://chs.asa-comparative-historical.org/.

    Although acquaintance with WordPress is an advantage, members with no prior experience can also volunteer for the position. Our web-editors work closely with the Section Council and Trajectories Newsletter editors.

    This is a great volunteering and service opportunity especially for graduate students and junior scholars who would like to be more closely involved with our Section. Interested members can contact Sahan Savas Karatasli (skaratasli [at] uncg.edu).  

  • Trajectories (Spring/Summer 2020)

    Trajectories (Spring/Summer 2020)

    You can access the latest issue of our newsletter Trajectories here.

  • Recent Articles by Our Members

    Recent Articles by Our Members

    Here are some recent publications from members of our section:

    Burchardt, Marian, and Ann Swidler. “Transplanting Institutional Innovation: Comparing the Success of NGOs and Missionary Protestantism in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Theory and Society 49 (2020): 335-64https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-020-09380-7

    Hammer, Ricarda. 2020. Decolonizing the Civil Sphere: The Politics of Difference, Imperial Erasures, and Theorizing from History. Sociological Theoryhttps://doi.org/10.1177/0735275120921215

    Luft, Aliza. 2020. Theorizing Moral Cognition: Culture in Action, Situations, and Relationships.” Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World. 6:1-15.

    Luft, Aliza. 2020. “Religion in Vichy France: How Meso-Level Actors Contribute to Authoritarian Legitimation.” European Journal of Sociology. 1-35.

    Luft, Aliza. 2020. “Three Stories and Three Questions about Participation in Genocide.” Journal of Perpetrator Research. 3(1), 196-206.

    Singh, Sourabh. 2020. To rely or not to rely on common sense? Introducing critical Realism’s insights to social network analysis. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12241

  • Pandemic’s Lesson: Global Capitalism is Uneven and Dangerously Particularistic

    Pandemic’s Lesson: Global Capitalism is Uneven and Dangerously Particularistic

    Şahan Savaş Karataşlı

    There is probably no better example of why “it is much easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism” than governments’ responses to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. The problem is not so much that the structural and ideological hegemony of capital accumulation prevents us from imagining alternative forms of organizing the economy, society, and politics. It is that, short of a global revolution that replaces the current world order with an alternative, endless accumulation of capital seems to be speeding up the coming of the end of the world at a much faster pace than contributing to its own demise. “Socialism or barbarism” was an appropriate slogan for the global left in the early 20th century, but it no longer is. Considering the deep interlinked crises that are on the eve of destroying the planet, the slogan that reflects the reality of the 21st century is “Socialism or apocalypse.” 

    Capital, Labor, and the State during the Coronavirus Lockdown

    The capitalist world-system we are living in has proven to be completely incapable of dealing with such a pandemic, which is unfortunately the least of our problems, considering the environmental, social, and geopolitical crises that are waiting at our door. Clearly, the problem at hand is not a lack of scientific knowledge, technology or socio-political means to stop the spread of a new virus. We have all this in the early 21st century. The real problem is that under capitalism any strategy or form of action that could potentially save millions of lives is immediately rejected if it has the side effect of temporarily halting or slowing the pace of capital accumulation.

    It is crystal clear that the class character of capitalist relations is deeply at odds with the state’s manifest aim of protecting citizens’ lives. Government responses to the Covid-19 pandemic reveal once again that when rulers around the world realize that they need to make a choice between risking either capital accumulation or human lives, most opt for risking/sacrificing the latter without much hesitation. This choice is self-evident in the hypocritical suggestions several governments have made concerning how to stop the pandemic. Most of them ignore the class character of the world we are living in and the concrete conditions of the global labor force.

    In the United States, for example, working class people, who cannot afford losing their jobs or their wages, are asked not to go to work if they are sick. Yet, they are often not granted any paid sick leave. People are advised to immediately seek medical aid when they show symptoms of high fever and dry cough. Yet, a right to universal healthcare and proper social security is denied them. Although the USA is a somewhat extreme example in terms of lack of social security and health care rights, other examples of hypocritical suggestions can easily be found in other regions of the world. For many precarious workers around the world who try to survive within the interstices of the informal economy, for instance, “social distancing” is not an option because it means hunger, homelessness, and starvation. While respectable citizens are asked to stay at home, to create their “home offices” and take time to protect themselves, “essential workers” (a category which must be registered as capital’s confession about who produces “value” in the economy) in material production, circulation, and logistics (and of course in health industries) are forced to work and reproduce their livelihoods in unsafe conditions.

    It would be wrong to suggest that the Covid-19 pandemic is going to trigger a universal crisis for capitalism. As in every crisis, the effect of the crisis on capitalist enterprises will be uneven across sectors. While some sectors see many bankruptcies, others will profit from the chaos and misery. So far, the spread of the coronavirus has been a goldmine for e-commerce marketplaces and the logistics/delivery sectors (such as Amazon, Instacart, Alibaba.com, Deliveroo), many pharmaceuticals, and online entertainment, streaming, and videoconferencing companies, to cite a few.

    If we turn our gaze from capitalist enterprises to their workers, however, we will see a different picture. Even workers employed in businesses that produce super-profits out of the current crisis will be negatively affected by the crisis. Companies such as Amazon and Instacart can more easily deny workers’ demands and rights because of the accumulation of a gigantic reserve army of labor of those who have lost their jobs due to the slowdown of the economy and to the stay-at-home orders, which has left many eager to take dangerous jobs at low wages and unsafe working conditions should Amazon and company need to replace recalcitrant employees. The overwhelming majority of the unemployed are not given proper compensation to pay their rent, cover their bills, and look after their families. The relative size and geographical spread of the emergent reserve army of labor will probably far exceed the levels we saw in the aftermath of the 1929 crisis. In short, Rosa Luxemburg’s dictum is even more relevant today: the only thing worse than being exploited by capital in deadly/unsafe conditions during a pandemic is not being exploited at all.

    Ineffective Government Responses in Financialized Economies of the Global North

    Interestingly, what appears at the first sight as “ineffective government responses” to the Covid-19 pandemic—such as lack of extensive testing and transparency and a slow response—turn out to be more beneficial than its alternatives. Proposed strategies such as flattening the epidemic curve by means of “social distancing” and “slowing down” are indeed counter-productive for capital accumulation for most sectors. After all, capitalism has always been characterized by the opposite movement. It tends to produce space-time compression by “connecting” the most distance parts of the world and “speeding up” social and material interactions. This is why, as far as capital accumulation is concerned, it is more rational to let the disease spread and wait for it to disappear on its own than to prolong social distancing and slowing down, which would eventually exacerbate the existing economic stagnation and crisis in the capitalist world economy.

    This is probably why, for much of the world—especially in regions which opted to gain profits primarily out of financial speculation and intermediation rather than material expansion of commodity production—letting the novel coronavirus spread to 65 to 85 percent of the population will be a quicker and less costly solution (in terms of what is economically important: profit). And there is also an added bonus for business-government complexes in the global North: The prediction that 2 percent of the infected population that would “unfortunately” die with this strategy will be concentrated overwhelmingly among the elderly—i.e., ex-commodified sections of the relative surplus population who can no longer be exploited by capital but who have been receiving pensions that they secured during the post-war era.

    From this perspective, pursuing what is often called “herd immunity” is a predatory accumulation strategy with genocidal implications for elderly people. Contrary to common assumptions, however, this strategy is not a mere fringe proposal but is instead being implemented in practice by many governments that are responding to the pandemic slowly or ineffectively. By externalizing the responsibility of “social distancing” to their citizens, by failing to help the working classes and broader masses prepare for the pandemic in a socially responsible way, and by rushing to return the economy to normalcy, many governments are already following the pro-capital “herd immunity” strategy without saying so.

    Considering the lack of transparency, lack of tests, and systematic underreporting of infection and death rates, it appears that many governments are banking on the assumption that the overwhelming majority of Covid-19 related fatalities will occur in the shadows, without attracting much attention or criticism. Comparing our current experience with the 1918 pandemic, we might see how this can be the case. While the so-called Spanish flu pandemic killed between 50 and 100 million people worldwide—more than both of the world wars combined—it did not attract much attention largely because, as Martin Kettle put it, “its onslaught did not occur in public but in private, behind closed doors in millions of homes.”

    Of course, the reason why many governments are forced to experiment with this “strategy” is because they do not have sufficient resources to deal with the pandemic. The lack of resources, even in the “most developed” parts of the world, and the inability to produce simple masks and protective gowns, let alone ventilators and diagnostic tests, signal the level of crisis produced by financialized capitalism. Put more directly, since finance capital has been totally remiss with regards to actual productive activity, lack of preparedness for the pandemic is one implication of the financialization of economies.

    Value Production in Emerging Markets of East Asia, New Leviathans, and New Authoritarianism

    Although the “herd immunity strategy” is widely used in various parts of the world, in some of the emerging economies of the global South, especially in the East Asia, we see a different picture. Instead of ineffective government responses, in regions such as China and South Korea, we see “successful” interventions by strong states. While China’s and South Korea’s responses are sometimes viewed as opposites—one based on hardline lockdowns, the other on transparency, government-society cooperation, and extensive surveillance—in reality they represent two varieties of a similar kind of response made possible by the existence of the same geopolitical-economic context and similar strategies of capital accumulation. In contrast with the previously-industrialized capitalist economies of much of the global North which are now leaders in financialization, capital accumulation in these regions is primarily based on material production of commodities. Consequently, value production is strong enough to accommodate the costs of a strong state-led response to stop the spread of the pandemic. While containing the pandemic through complete lockdowns, construction of new hospitals, distribution of masks and protective gear, and reliance on surveillance and extensive tests are expensive in the short run, the existence of material and labor-intensive value production ensures that these economies will recover quickly. Likewise, to ensure that labor-intensive value production can continue in the long term, these governments are also more motivated to take strident measures to protect the human population.

    As in previous epochs, the effects of these divergent capital accumulation strategies may have very significant effects for politics at the global and local levels. At the global level, for instance, the relative failure at containing the coronavirus pandemic in the core capitalist regions in “the West” versus the relative success in the emergent geo-economic powers in “the East” became an important symbolic marker signaling the demise of the superiority of “the West” and giving the government-business complexes in the Eastern Asia region an opportunity for global leadership in the 21st century, if they play their cards right. From this perspective, the crisis produced by the Covid-19 pandemic may play a comparable role to that of the world wars in affecting the last world-hegemonic transition.

    At the local level, the same processes have the potential to further strength the already-existing authoritarian tendencies arising in much of the world. Interestingly, in the face of the so-called “ineffective government responses” that risk millions of lives, many citizens around the world have already started to ask their governments to declare curfews, stay-at-home orders, travel bans, and other “limitations of rights and liberties” to stop the pandemic. This call from below for new “Leviathans” during the current state of (capitalist/pandemic) nature is also an open invitation to the right-wing authoritarian leaders to grab power, as Viktor Orban recently did in Hungary. Currently, some right-wing authoritarian governments seem to be using the lack of mass mobilizations from below, due in large part to the pandemic, as an opportunity to suppress their democratic challengers and opponents. In Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey, for instance, the AKP government has taken control of four more pro-Kurdish municipal administrations (Batman, Silvan, Lice, and Ergani), removing the pro-Kurdish HDP mayors from their posts, detaining them, and appointing their own trustees. Using Covid-19 as a pretext, the same government is working on a law that would release 90,000 criminals from prison—but that would keep political prisoners locked up.

    Ideas such as closing the borders, controlling immigration, increasing surveillance, and using strategic censorship to avoid panic also resonate with authoritarian nationalists seeking power elsewhere in the world. Considering that such pandemics or other forms of environmental, social, and geopolitical crises will continue to take place in the following years and decades, probably at an increasing pace, it is not difficult to see that the global right will use such crises to declare Schmittian “emergencies” and thus to take power and expand their influence in many parts of the world in the name of protecting their people.

    The Global Left and Internationalism in an Era of Pandemics

    It is important to note that although the Covid-19 pandemic helped a broad spectrum of the left refresh their faith in a critique of capitalism, the global left has not been a major actor in shaping responses to the pandemic crisis so far. As far as the global left is concerned, the Covid-19 pandemic teaches an important historical lesson: Being correct on a political issue is not sufficient to win a struggle. At first sight, the Covid-19 pandemic appears to be a huge opportunity for the global left because it reveals the hypocritical class character of the world-we-are-living-in in a very explicit manner, even to the most skeptical of eyes. In many parts of the world, leftist organizations have raised urgent demands such as safer work conditions, paid sick leave, the right to stay at home, unemployment benefits, and a rent freeze. Given the pandemic, these ideas appeal not only to the left’s usual constituents but also much more broadly. It has even been argued that everyone became a socialist during the pandemic. Yet, the global left has not been a major player in this transformative moment.

    The crux of the problem is that the global left has been raising demands in an abstract manner without an equally strong mass mobilization from below. While there are obvious challenges regarding finding ways to initiate and sustain collective action from below in an era of pandemics, millions of people who manage to work in this environment have the capacity to develop and employ suitable forms of collective action. Indeed, this is already happening. From Italy to the USA there are ongoing and very serious efforts by workers to organize union-led or wildcat strikes and other forms of collective action from below, such as workplace occupations. Considering the structural bargaining power most “essential” workers have at this point, it is not inconceivable that we might soon see a major wave of collective action from below similar to the resurgence of labor unrest during and in the aftermath of the world wars.

    Yet, for this emergent wave of labor unrest to be successful, as we struggle to “flatten the epidemic curve,” we must also find ways to “unflatten the collective action curve” by coordinating and synchronizing spontaneous mass actions from below. Governments and businesses can easily ignore and suppress many particularistic, uncoordinated forms of spontaneous collective action if they are dispersed over time and space as isolated events. However, if movements are coordinated and clustered, the frequency, geographical spread and strength of these movements will pass governments’ and businesses’ capacity to contain and suppress them, which will give the movements the necessary power to push forward their demands. This is what we can expect under Covid-19.

    Of course, the key task of activists should not merely be “clustering” the movements in space and time but also helping workers in different sectors, peasants/small farmers, movement lawyers, cooperatives, unions, etc. develop solidaristic relations and coordinate with each other. The key problem of sustaining prolonged strikes in this environment is the lack of resources: first and foremost food, shelter, and medical supplies. This is where solidarity with the peasantry, semi-proletarianized workers who still have access to land, and production cooperatives comes into the picture.

    While the formation of a “movement of movements” at local and global levels is an absolutely necessary component of a successful global left strategy, it will definitely not be sufficient in the long run. Furthermore, to win, it is not enough to have short-term bargaining power against businesses and governments. The actual victory of the global left also requires a total transformation of the social, economic, and political systems we are living in, with a global and long-term focus. Our experience with the coronavirus pandemic illustrates why such representing, bringing to the front, and defending the global and long-run interests against particularistic gains is absolutely vital. Today, with the advantage of hindsight—i.e., seeing how Covid-19 has been spreading all around the world and how it is not feasible to contain once it has spread in this manner—many would agree that the best way to protect lives in the rest of the world would have been to identify and exterminate the disease when it first originated in Wuhan. The problem is that when the coronavirus outbreak occurred, only a few realized that the fate that befell the people of Wuhan would soon be that of the people of Lombardia, Madrid, Qom, New York City, Istanbul, and the rest of the world. De te fabula narratur.

    The interesting property of the coronavirus pandemic is that it spreads at such a quick rate that it is like a slap in the face, reminding us about the stupidity of our egocentric and myopic biases based on our current particularistic experiences. Our obsession with our own experiences at the present moment (and our related assent to national, racial, and class-based boundaries) creates the dangerous illusion that the story told is not actually ours, that what we see elsewhere in the world is not linked to us, that it is their fate and their problem and there is not much we can do other than to feel sympathy for them. Due to the extraordinary speed of the spread of coronavirus, it is easy to see how utterly nonsensical this egocentric, particularistic, and presentist worldview is.

    We are living in a world where the fate of our lives depends on others not only in spatio-temporal terms but also in terms of asymmetric power relations. Our key problems in social, economic and political spheres are interlinked in complex ways. So are the possible solutions to our problems. During normal times, when we talk about environmental crises, geopolitical wars, refugee crises, economic crises, unemployment, and class/ethnic/national/gender-based oppression, it is more difficult to see that the fate of all humanity is also linked to the fate of the most oppressed, exploited, and excluded sections of society and to nature.

    It is now relatively easier to see that to emancipate all humans and other natural beings, we need to exterminate systems generating exploitation, oppression, and exclusion not only in our geographies but everywhere they exist. So, in addition to a “movement of movements” that would forge international solidarity at local, national, and global levels, the global left needs an internationalist political organization to defend the long-run and universal interests of these movements with an eye to exterminating such systems. The global left is not ready for this in its current struggle against Covid-19; but as I mentioned at the beginning, this is unfortunately the least of our problems now. We will get through this Covid-19 pandemic period  in one way or another, but the exploitative, oppressive, and exclusionary systems that we are living in will survive. Thus, we must be ready for the more decisive struggles that await us.

    Şahan Savaş Karataşlı is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at University of North Carolina, Greensboro. His research areas include international political economy, global and comparative-historical sociology, and social movements, with a focus on financialization, nationalism, and labor movements. 

  • Rational Choice Sociology: Essays on Theory, Collective Action and Social Order

    Rational Choice Sociology: Essays on Theory, Collective Action and Social Order

    Michael Hechter. Rational Choice Sociology: Essays on Theory, Collective Action, and Social Order.  Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2019.

    Whereas rational choice theory has enjoyed considerable success in economics and political science, due to its emphasis on individual behavior sociologists have long doubted its capacity to account for non-market social outcomes. Whereas they have conceded that rational choice theory may be an appropriate tool to understand strictly economic phenomena – that is, the kinds of social interactions that occur in the gesellschaft– many sociologists have contended that the theory is wholly unsuitable for the analysis of the kinds of social interactions in the gemeinschaft – such as those occurring in families, in social groups of all kinds, and in society at large. In a variety of non-technical chapters, Rational Choice Sociology shows that a sociological version of rational choice theory indeed can make valuable contributions to the analysis of a wide variety of non-market outcomes, including those concerning social norms, family dynamics, crime, rebellion, state formation and social order.

  • The Genesis of Rebellion: Governance, Grievance and Mutiny in the Age of Sail

    The Genesis of Rebellion: Governance, Grievance and Mutiny in the Age of Sail

    Steven Pfaff and Michael Hechter, The Genesis of Rebellion: Governance, Grievance and Mutiny in the Age of Sail. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020.

    The Age of Sail has long fascinated readers, writers, and the general public. Herman Melville, Joseph Conrad, Jack London et al. treated ships at sea as microcosms; Petri dishes in which larger themes of authority, conflict and order emerge. In this fascinating book, Pfaff and Hechter explore mutiny as a manifestation of collective action and contentious politics. The authors use narrative evidence and statistical analysis to trace the processes by which governance failed, social order decayed, and seamen mobilized. Their findings highlight the complexities of governance, showing that it was not mere deprivation, but how seamen interpreted that deprivation, which stoked the grievances that motivated rebellion. Using the Age of Sail as a lens to examine topics still relevant today – what motivates people to rebel against deprivation and poor governance – The Genesis of Rebellion: Governance, Grievance, and Mutiny in the Age of Sail helps us understand the emergence of populism and rejection of the establishment.

  • Breaching the Civil Order: Radicalism and the Civil Sphere

    Breaching the Civil Order: Radicalism and the Civil Sphere

    Breaching the Civil Order: Radicalism and the Civil Sphere. 2020. Edited by Jeffrey Alexander, Trevor Stack and Farhad Khosrokhavar. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781108427234 (hardback)

    It is not only a paradox but something of an intellectual scandal that, in an era so shaken by radical actions and ideologies, social science has had nothing theoretically new to say about radicalism since the middle of the last century. Breaching the Civil Order fills this void. It argues that, rather than seeing radicalism in substantive terms – as violent or militant, communist or fascist – radicalism should be seen more broadly as any organized effort to breach the civil order. The theory is brilliantly made flesh in a series of case studies by leading European and American social scientists, from the destruction of property in the London race riots to the public militancy of Black Lives Matter in the United States, from the performative violence of the Irish IRA and the Mexican Zapatistas to the democratic upheavals of the Arab Spring, and from Islamic terrorism in France to Germany’s right-wing Pegida.